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CAN ALL BEINGS POTENTIALLY ATTAIN AWAKENING?
GOTRA-THEORY IN THE MAHAYANASUTRALAÓKARA
MARIO D’AMATO

The Mahayana has sometimes been associated with the doctrine that all
sentient beings will attain complete awakening, a doctrine which is often
linked to some conception of the “embryo of the Tathagata” (tathagatagarbha)1. However, according to an alternate Mahayana doctrine, only
some sentient beings will attain the complete awakening of a buddha — and
some may even be excluded from attaining any form of awakening at all.
In this paper, I will examine just such a doctrine, as it is found in an Indian
Yogacara treatise, the Mahayanasutralaµkara (“Ornament to the Mahayana
Sutras”; abbr., MSA), a Sanskrit verse-text, and its prose commentary, the
Mahayanasutralaµkara-bhaÒya (MSABh)2. Particular Tibetan and Chinese
sources attribute the composition of the MSA to the bodhisattva Maitreya3,
which gives us some indication of the importance this text was understood
to have within certain traditions. Nevertheless, the authorship and date of
1
A concise introduction to this doctrine, and the Mahayana sutras to which it is related,
may be found in Williams 1989, Chapter 5.
2
When referring to both the verse-text and the prose commentary together, I will use
the abbreviation MSA/Bh. By the term “the text” I mean the MSA and the MSABh taken
together, by “the verse-text” I mean the MSA, and by “the commentary” I mean the MSABh.
Throughout this paper, for the Sanskrit I will quote from Lévi’s edition of the MSA/Bh
(1907); I have also consulted the editions of Bagchi (1970; based on Lévi’s edition) and
Funahashi (1985; select chapters based on mss. from Nepal). All translations are my own.
The Tibetan canon contains the following relevant works: the MSA (verse-text): DT 4020;
the MSA/Bh (verse-text along with prose commentary): DT 4026; the MSAVBh (Sthiramati’s
subcommentary to the text): DT 4034; and the MSAT (Asvabhava’s subcommentary to the
text): DT 4029. The MSA/Bh also appears in the Chinese canon (Taisho 1604), although with
some differences from the Sanskrit version; on this, see Nagao 1961: vi.
3
The colophon of the Derge edition of the MSA states that the verse-text was composed by Maitreya. Bu ston (1290-1364) includes the MSA as one of the five Maitreyatexts; see Obermiller 1987: 53-54. Ui (1928: 221) identifies a Chinese tradition of the “five
treatises of Maitreya,” which differs from the Tibetan list of texts, but which also includes
the MSA. Xuanzang (seventh century CE) writes that Asanga received the MSA and other
texts from Maitreya; see Beal 1906, vol. 1: 226.
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the verse-text and its commentary are not certain; I hypothesize that the
MSA/Bh may be dated to the fourth century CE (perhaps c. 350 CE)4. It is
my hope that an examination of such a source may contribute to the study
of the various ways in which the contours of the Mahayana have been
drawn from a doctrinal perspective. In the MSA/Bh, one way in which the
limits of the Mahayana are defined is through the employment of the gotratheory, a theory which identifies the soteriological potentialities of individuals through reference to their spiritual “family” or “lineage.” So in
order to understand this text’s discursive construction of the category
“Mahayana,” we must understand its concept of gotra.
In the context of discussions of Buddhism, the term gotra has been
variously translated as “family” (Edgerton 1970, vol. 2: 216), “basis,
source, cause, seed” (ibid.), “kind, class, category” (ibid.), “species”
(Wayman 1961: 58), or “spiritual lineage” (Ruegg 1968: 303, Griffiths
1990b: 49)5. Again, in the MSA/Bh, gotra represents the soteriological
category to which a particular sentient being belongs: an individual’s
gotra is taken to be indicative of that individual’s soteriological possibilities, i.e., what type of — or even whether — awakening can be attained.
So if a particular being is said to belong to the bodhisattva-gotra, then that
being has the potentiality for the awakening of a buddha, and if a particular being is classified as “without gotra” (agotraka), this indicates that,
at least for the present, that being does not have the “seed” to attain any
form of awakening at all.
4
My working hypothesis is that earlier strata of the MSA were compiled, redacted,
added to, and commented upon by one person, and I take the result of this process to be
the received text of the MSA/Bh. An extended introduction to the MSA/Bh — its editions
and translations, structure and contents, authorship, date, and relation to a larger corpus of
texts — may be found in Chapter 2 of my PhD dissertation (D’Amato 2000).
5
Ruegg (1976: 354) offers the following meanings of gotra in Buddhist usage: i. “mine,
matrix”; ii. “family, clan, lineage”; iii. “germ, seed”; and (iv.) “class, category.” He also
offers a preliminary discussion of the relation of the term gotra to other possible cognate
terms in Iranian languages; his provisional hypothesis is that it might be possible to derive
the various meanings of the cognate terms — including the Vedic meaning “cattle-pen”
— from a root meaning “origin, source” (ibid., 354-356). In the context of the MSA/Bh,
the translation “spiritual lineage” is perhaps most appropriate. “Spiritual lineage,” however, should not be confused with the notion of a lineage of transmission or tradition
(parampara). In any case, in this paper when using the term gotra, I will leave it untranslated and unitalicized.
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Given that for the MSA/Bh gotra is indicative of a sentient being’s
soteriological potentiality, an important issue is whether gotra is able to
be acquired by every sentient being or whether there are some beings
who are excluded from ever acquiring a gotra; and furthermore if some
beings are excluded, in what sense they are excluded6. It will be necessary to understand these issues in order to address the question of whether,
from the perspective of the MSA/Bh, all sentient beings can potentially
attain awakening7. And so I will begin by discussing the meanings of the
term gotra in the MSA/Bh—including its relations to other important
terms and concepts. Then I will turn to a presentation of the various categories or subdivisions of gotra according to the text. Following this,
I will consider the text’s gotra-theory in relation to some related doctrines in the MSA/Bh. I will then conclude with a response to the question of whether all sentient beings can potentially attain awakening.
Gotra defined
As I stated above, a number of translations have been offered for the
term gotra. The MSA/Bh itself offers an interesting interpretation of the
term. In explaining the use of the phrase gu∞ottara∞ata (“having the characteristic of increasing virtues”) in 3.4, the commentary states:
gu∞ottara∞arthena gotraµ veditavyaµ gu∞a uttaranty asmad udbhavantiti k®tva/
Gotra should be known as that which increases virtues, since virtues arise
and increase because of it8.
6
For example, according to the Buddhabhumyupadesa certain beings are excluded in
a predetermined sense: “From the beginningless beginning all sentient beings are divided
into five kinds of lineages (gotra)…. the first four of the above will ultimately attain final
cessation… But the fifth lineage… will never reach a time of final cessation” (Keenan
1980: 494). For other references to gotra as a predetermined category in Buddhist literature, see Lamotte 1976: 304.
7
In my general formulation of this question, I have benefited from Ruegg’s work on
the gotra-theory, especially 1968, 1969: 73-107, and 1976.
8
Mano (1967: 970) points out that this etymological interpretation (nirukta) is also
given by Haribhadra (end of the eighth c. CE) in the Abhisamayalaµkaraloka (the
Abhisamayalaµkara [AA] is considered by Bu ston to be another of the five Maitreya-texts),
as well as by both Arya-Vimuktisena and Bhadanta-Vimuktisena in their earlier commentaries to the AA.

118

MARIO D'AMATO

From this we may see that for the MSA/Bh, acquiring a gotra means
acquiring the ability to increase virtues. And this ability is of no small
importance according to the text, because the development of a number
of virtues is understood as necessary for the attainment of particular soteriological goals. More specifically, gotra is posited as the cause of differences in inclination towards a particular vehicle (adhimukti) — that is
to say, which soteriological vehicle one will be inclined to follow; religious practice (pratipatti); and awakening itself (bodhi) (MSA 3.2). It is
said to be the basis of knowledge (jñana), purification from the afflictions (klesa-nairmalya), and the supernormal powers, such as the higher
knowledges (abhijña) (MSABh ad 3.9). It is said to be the cause of great
awakening, great knowledge, concentration (samadhi), and the maturation of sentient beings (MSA 3.10). Gotra is also identified as one cause
for the production of the thought of awakening (cittotpada) (MSABh ad
4.7), compassion (ad 17.34), the practice of the perfections (ad 16.16),
and the specific perfection of patience (ad 8.6). Indeed at MSA 19.61
gotra is identified as the first of the ten aspects of the Mahayana, thus it
is understood to be the foundation upon which the practice of the
Mahayana is based9. According to the MSA/Bh, then, having a gotra is
foundational to attaining any specific Buddhist soteriological goal.
Having considered the MSA/Bh’s explanation of the term gotra, we now
turn to terms that are used as equivalent to it in the text. One such equivalent term used by the text is dhatu. In fact, there are two places in the text
in which gotra and dhatu are used interchangeably10. The first is at 11.8,
where the verse-text uses the term tridhatuka. Here the commentary states:
tatra dhatu-niyato yaÌ sravakadi-gotra-niyataÌ/
There [in the previous line of the text] a definite dhatu is a definite gotra,
such as sravaka.

Although the term dhatu has a number of meanings in this and other
texts, in this instance, “stage” or “level of attainment” seems to be the
9
Chapter 19 of the MSA/Bh is specifically devoted to the topic of the gu∞as; furthermore, at MSA/Bh 19.59-61, all of the virtues referred to in this paragraph are either
explicitly mentioned or implicitly contained in the lists that occur there.
10
Furthermore, as Ruegg (1969: 85) points out, in a number of places the Tibetan text
of the MSA/Bh has rigs (normally gotra) for khams (normally dhatu).
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most appropriate. In another context (at 11.43) the verse-text uses the
term arya-gotra, the “noble gotra,” which the commentary glosses with
anasrava-dhatu, the “undefiled realm” — i.e., the realm or level of attainment in which there is no longer the influx of afflictions which bind one
to saµsara. Here, then, we may infer that gotra is understood in terms of
a spiritual stage or level of attainment11.
The term gotra is also used twice in the commentary as a gloss for
prak®ti, or “nature.” The commentary to 8.5 glosses svaprak®tya — “by
one’s nature” or “according to one’s nature” — with gotre∞a — an instrumental form of the term meaning “by gotra” or “according to gotra.”
Also, the commentary to 18.19-21 glosses the term prak®tya with gotrataÌ,
an ablative form of the term meaning “due to one’s gotra.” So here the
term gotra refers to one’s “nature.”12
While the term gotra has been equated with spiritual stage or level of
attainment (dhatu) and nature (prak®ti)13, it is so far unclear whether this
stage or nature represents something predetermined or something acquired.
That is to say, if the development of certain capacities or virtues is due
to one’s nature — or due to one’s gotra — then does gotra represent a
predetermined and predetermining category, or does it represent an
acquirable and alterable category of spiritual potentiality? And if it is
acquirable, is it acquirable by all? These are questions that I will return
to below. In any case, belonging to a certain gotra means having the
potentiality for reaching specific soteriological goals. The next step in
understanding gotra, then, is understanding the different categories or
subdivisions of gotra according to the text.
Categories of gotra
In Indian Buddhist literature, a list of the following five gotras may be
found: sravaka-gotra, pratyekabuddha-gotra, bodhisattva-gotra, indefinite
11
In this connection, according to Ruegg (1974: 204), the Visuddhimagga equates
ariya-gotta with ariya-bhumi, which Ruegg translates as “spiritual stage of the saint.”
12
However, note that at neither of these locations does the text posit that one’s nature
(prak®ti) is to be understood as beginningless or unalterable.
13
These synonyms for gotra are also found in the Bodhisattvabhumi (Sanskrit edition,
Dutt 1966: 2); a third synonym given in that text is bija, “seed.”
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gotra (aniyata-gotra), and without gotra (agotraka)14. Sometimes this list
of five is shortened to just the first three members15, which the MSA/Bh
then aligns with the three vehicles: those of the sravaka-gotra go by the
sravakayana, etc. But such a shortening of the list need not reflect any
serious philosophical differences. Only the first three gotras result in particular Buddhist soteriological goals, since only the first three gotras correspond to particular Buddhist soteriological vehicles. Furthermore, being
classified under the category of indefinite gotra may be understood as a
liminal state: when one’s gotra becomes definite, it will be in terms of
one of the three standard gotras of sravaka, pratyekabuddha, or bodhisattva. And the category “without gotra,” after all, is not properly an
element of the list of categories of gotra. Therefore, the lists of five and
three gotras may be seen as having different conceptual emphases, rather
than different theoretical bases.
While the MSA/Bh offers no specific list of gotras that corresponds to
those given above, each member of the list of five is either explicitly
mentioned or implicitly referred to16. Furthermore, it is clear that the
14
For example, the Mahavyutpatti contains the following fivefold list of gotras (12611265): sravaka-yanabhisamaya-gotraÌ, pratyekabuddha-yanabhisamaya-gotraÌ, tathagata-yanabhisamaya-gotraÌ (gotra for the realization of the vehicle of sravakas, pratyekabuddhas, and tathagatas, respectively), aniyata-gotraÌ (indefinite gotra), agotrakaÌ
(without gotra); see Sakaki 1926. The Mahavyutpatti is a compilation of lists of Sanskrit
Buddhist terms, along with their Tibetan translations, that dates to the early ninth century
CE, centuries after the time of the MSA/Bh. Nevertheless, when a particular list is found
in the Mahavyutpatti, this suggests that the list was important to Indian Buddhist thought
at the time. The fivefold list of gotras is also significant for our purposes since Sthiramati
offers the same one in his subcommentary to the MSA/Bh (DT sems tsam MI 48a3-4).
15
The three gotras are referred to in the Saµdhinirmocana-sutra (SNS); Lamotte 1935:
73-74 and 198-199 offers the Tibetan text and French translation, respectively; cf. Powers 1995: 110-115. The SNS is considered to be one of the earliest Yogacara sutras (along
with the Mahayanabhidharma-sutra, which is no longer extant). Although the MSABh
does not explicitly refer to or quote the SNS, Schmithausen (1976: 240, note 2) makes the
convincing point that MSA 19.44ab presupposes SNS 8.20.2 in its discussion of the seven
types of thusness (tathata). The Abhidharmakosa-bhaÒya ad 6.23cd also identifies the three
gotras (Sanskrit edition, Pradhan 1967: 348). Other lists of gotras appear in Indian Buddhist
literature. For example, the MahavibhaÒasastra mentions six different gotras; but even in
this case the principal gotras of the VaibhaÒikas are the standard three identified here; see
Davidson 1985: 94-95.
16
The bodhisattva-gotra is mentioned in various places, e.g., MSABh ad 3.5, 3.7, 3.8,
etc.; the verse-text refers to it as the “foremost-gotra” (MSA 3.13: agra-gotra) or “noblegotra” (MSA 11.43: arya-gotra). The sravaka-gotra is mentioned at MSABh ad 11.8,
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MSA/Bh posits the superiority of the bodhisattva-gotra: in linking gotra
to the roots of virtue (kusala-mula), the commentary to 3.3 states that the
roots of virtue of the bodhisattva-gotra are far superior to those of the
sravaka-gotra — those of the sravaka-gotra, for example, lack the special
powers of a buddha. And in 11.43 the commentary states that the noble
gotra of buddhas — i.e., the bodhisattva-gotra17 — is distinct from those
of the sravaka and pratyekabuddha for five reasons: (1) it is purified from
the impregnating afflictions (savasana-klesa), (2) it purifies a buddhafield, and (3-5) it attains the three buddha-bodies.
The MSA/Bh explicitly aligns each of the first three gotras with one of
the soteriological vehicles (yanas). The commentary to 3.2 states that there
is a difference in gotra with respect to the three vehicles — the three vehicles here being the sravakayana, pratyekabuddhayana, and bodhisattvayana18.
The commentary also goes on to distinguish three types of awakening (inferior, middling, or superior), stating that each corresponds to a particular
gotra in the way that a fruit corresponds to its seed19. And at 5.4-5 the commentary states that there are three gotras: again, inferior, middling, or superior. Thus the MSA/Bh posits the following threefold structure:
spiritual category
sravaka-gotra
pratyekabuddha-gotra
bodhisattva-gotra

soteriological vehicle
sravakayana
pratyekabuddhayana
bodhisattvayana

form of awakening
inferior
middling
superior

It is clear, then, that the category of gotra is of importance to the
MSA/Bh’s soteriological scheme because different gotras lead to different
11.53, etc. The pratyekabuddha-gotra is implicitly referred to in the phrase sravakadigotra, “the gotra of sravakas, etc.” [i.e., pratyekabuddhas and bodhisattvas] at MSABh ad
11.8. The indefinite gotra is mentioned at MSA 3.6, etc., and the category “without gotra”
is mentioned at MSA 1.14, etc. Again, Sthiramati’s subcommentary does offer the specific
list of five gotras; see note 14.
17
It is quite clear that buddha-gotra is another term for bodhisattva-gotra, and not a
separate category. MSABh ad 3.2 states there are three forms of awakening, and that each
form corresponds to a gotra as a fruit corresponds to its seed: thus the awakening of a buddha corresponds to the bodhisattva-gotra. Then MSABh ad 3.4 states that gotra does not
exist along with its fruit; so when the awakening of a buddha is attained, no gotra exists.
18
While the first two vehicles are specifically mentioned in the text (see, e.g., MSABh
ad 19.44), the third is not; the term mahayana is used rather than bodhisattvayana.
19
Here we see gotra understood in terms of a seed, as in definition iii. offered by
Ruegg; see note 5.
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soteriological goals. To trace this out a bit further, we may mention the
following points: (1) the first two gotras belong to the Hinayana, while
the third gotra belongs to the Mahayana20; (2) the Hinayana is said to bring
about the termination of the afflictive obstructions (klesavara∞a), while
the Mahayana is said to bring about the termination of both the afflictive
and the cognitive obstructions (jñeyavara∞a)21; (3) the Hinayana leads to
lesser forms of awakening, and ultimately to nirva∞a without residual
conditioning (nirupadhiseÒa-nirva∞a) — which the text interprets as a
form of extinction22; (4) the Mahayana leads to a superior form of awakening — the complete awakening of a buddha, an awareness of all objects
of knowledge and all modes of appearance (sarva-jñeya-sarvakara-jñana),
viz., omniscience — which is a state of being coextensive with reality
(thusness, tathata) itself, since the text posits that ultimately there is no
distinction between subject and object23; furthermore, the Mahayana does
not lead to the extinction of nirva∞a without residual conditioning, but
rather to non-abiding nirva∞a (apratiÒ†hita-nirva∞a) — an attainment
which allows for continued manifestations in the world in order to aid sentient beings24. So the MSA/Bh’s gotra-theory is of central importance to
the text’s soteriological theory, since the first two gotras lead to lesser
forms of awakening which ultimately terminate in extinction (nonexistence), while the third gotra leads to complete awakening which is
nothing less than omniscience (coextension with reality itself).
While the preceding gives us a sense of the MSA/Bh’s presentation of the
gotras of sravaka, pratyekabuddha, and bodhisattva, in order to understand
20
MSA 15.4 refers to the “twofold Hinayana” (nihinayana-dvividha), viz., the
sravakayana and pratyekabuddha-yana. There is further textual evidence for identifying
the sravaka- and pratyekabuddhayanas with the hinayana; on this, see D’Amato 2000: 177178.
21
See, e.g., MSABh ad 17.4-5 and MSA/Bh 20-21.44.
22
See MSABh ad 3.3, 16.50, etc. In every place where the term nirupadhiseÒa- or anupadhiseÒa-nirva∞a is used in the text, some form of the term kÒaya (“loss, destruction, end,
termination”) is also used.
23
While this is by no means the standard account of omniscience offered in Buddhist
traditions, it is the one that I believe is most defensible as a reading of the MSA/Bh; see
MSA/Bh 20-21.58, Griffiths 1990a: 106-108, and D’Amato 2000: 130-131, 141-146, and
152-154.
24
See MSA/Bh 17.32, 19.61-62, etc. On both forms of nirva∞a in the text, see D’Amato
2000, Chapter 5.
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the text’s gotra-theory more fully, we must also consider the latter two
gotras in our initial fivefold list: indefinite gotra and without gotra. Regarding the indefinite gotra, we may begin with a consideration of MSA 3.6,
where the verse-text introduces a fourfold classification of gotras:
niyataniyataµ gotram aharyaµ haryam eva ca/
pratyayair gotra-bhedo ’yaµ samasena catur-vidhaÌ//
Gotra can be definite or indefinite, incapable of being lost or able to be lost.
In sum, according to conditions, the distinctions of gotra are fourfold.

While the verse seems to set up a fourfold classification system (definite-incapable of being lost, definite-able to be lost, etc.), the commentary reduces this to a twofold system: “definite” corresponding only to
“incapable of being lost,” and “indefinite” corresponding only to “able
to be lost.”25 The commentary’s move here is supported by the fact that
while the term “indefinite” (aniyata) is again used by the text in connection with the term gotra (at MSA/Bh 11.54), neither term of the pair
“incapable of being lost/able to be lost” (aharya/harya) is again linked
to it. Furthermore, Sthiramati’s subcommentary agrees with the MSABh
in specifying that “definite” corresponds to “incapable of being lost”
and “indefinite” corresponds to “able to be lost.”26
Regarding the classification definite/indefinite, it is significant that for
the MSA/Bh indefinite gotra does not represent a fourth gotra alongside
the three standard gotras. Rather, any sentient being belonging to one of
the three specific gotras may be further classified according to whether
that specific gotra is definite or indefinite. If the gotra is definite that
means it is fixed and will not be lost, but if the gotra is indefinite that
means it is not fixed and there is the possibility that it can be lost or
changed after it has been acquired.
The text further discusses the indefinite gotra in a section devoted to
the analysis of the ekayana (a doctrine which the MSA/Bh does not

25
MSABh ad 3.6: samasena caturvidhaµ gotraµ niyataniyataµ tad eva yatha-kramaµ pratyayair aharyaµ haryaµ ceti/.
26
MSAVBh ad 3.6 (DT sems tsam MI 45b4-5): de bas na rigs nes pa rnams ni rkyen
gyis mi ’phrogs pa zes bya ste/… rigs ma nes pa rnams ni rkyen gyis ’phrog pa zes bya
ste/.
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consider to be definitive, but rather in need of interpretation). At 11.54,
the verse-text states:
akarÒa∞artham ekeÒam anya-saµdhara∞aya ca/
desitaniyatanaµ hi saµbuddhair ekayanata//
For the purpose of attracting some, and for supporting others, the fully
awakened ones taught the fact of one vehicle for those who are indefinite.

The commentary goes on to specify that those who are attracted are
those with an indefinite sravaka-gotra and those who are supported are
those with an indefinite bodhisattva-gotra. Also, in discussing the function of buddhahood as a refuge, the commentary to 9.8 states:
hinayana-paritra∞atvam aniyata-gotra∞aµ mahayanaikayani-kara∞at/
[Buddhahood] protects those of an indefinite gotra from the Hinayana by constructing the uniform path of the Mahayana.

Although this comment refers to the indefinite gotra without linking it
to one of the three specific gotras, it seems reasonable to read it in terms
of 11.54: buddhas teach the unity of vehicles in order to lure those of an
indefinite sravaka-gotra away from the Hinayana, and in order to keep
those of an indefinite bodhisattva-gotra from entering the Hinayana.
Furthermore, in discussing the ten types of sentient beings towards whom
bodhisattvas are compassionate (MSA/Bh 17.29-30), the verse-text refers
to one type as those who have gone astray, which the commentary specifies as those who are indefinite in adhering to the Hinayana — a reference to the indefinite sravaka- and pratyekabuddha-gotras27.
In the commentary to verse 11.53 the MSABh mentions the indefinite
sravaka-gotra, stating that those of this gotra may attain final liberation
through the Mahayana28. Thus there is the possibility for one of an indefinite sravaka-gotra to acquire the bodhisattva-gotra. Furthermore, if as
27
MSABh ad 17.29-30: utpatha-prasthita hinayana-prayukta aniyataÌ/. Again, hinayana
refers to the sravakayana and pratyekabuddhayana. While the indefinite pratyekabuddhagotra is not specifically mentioned in the MSA/Bh, it is mentioned in Sthiramati’s subcommentary. In fact, Sthiramati specifies that each of the three specific gotras may be definite or indefinite; see MSAVBh ad 3.6 (DT sems tsam MI 45a6-7).
28
MSABh ad 11.53: aniyata-sravaka-gotra∞aµ mahayanena nirya∞ad yanti tena yanam
iti k®tva/.
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11.54 states some bodhisattvas are in need of support, this implies that
one of an indefinite bodhisattva-gotra has the possibility of losing that
gotra. So for one of an indefinite gotra there is the possibility of losing
one’s gotra and transferring to another29.
The final classification to consider is that of being without gotra, a category that is the topic of MSA/Bh 3.11. Here, the verse-text and commentary state:
aikantiko duscarite ’sti kascit kascit samudghatita-sukla-dharma/
amokÒa-bhagiya-subho ’sti kascin nihina-suklo ’sty api hetu-hinaÌ//30
aparinirva∞a-dharmaka etasminn agotrastho ’bhipretaÌ/ sa ca samasato
dvividhaÌ/ tat-kalaparinirva∞a-dharma atyantaµ ca/ tat-kalaparinirva∞adharma caturvidhaÌ/… atyantaparinirva∞a-dharma tu hetu-hino yasya
parinirva∞a-gotram eva nasti/
Some have solely ill conduct, some have pure qualities that have been
destroyed, some have purity that is not associated with liberation, or an inferior purity, and some also lack the cause.
This [verse] refers to those who are without gotra, those who lack the qualities associated with parinirva∞a. And this is concisely in two ways: lacking the qualities associated with parinirva∞a at the present time and for ever
(or “absolutely”; atyantam). Lacking the qualities associated with
parinirva∞a at the present time can be in four ways…. But those who for ever
(or “absolutely”; atyanta) lack the qualities associated with parinirva∞a
— those who lack the cause — simply do not have the parinirva∞a gotra.

So according to the text, being without gotra means lacking the qualities associated with parinirva∞a (aparinirva∞a-dharmaka)31. And there
are two ways in which this might occur: lacking the qualities associated with parinirva∞a at the present time (tat-kala) and lacking them
for ever or absolutely (atyantam). The first option — lacking the qualities at the present time (tat-kala) — is explained with reference to the
29
For a discussion of this issue in the Buddhabhumyupadesa, see Keenan 1980: 678684; briefly, those of an indefinite gotra may attain nirva∞a either through the Mahayana
or through one of the other vehicles.
30
Following the commentary, I do not interpret this verse in terms of the standard
four padas; I read the last pada as identifying two elements in a list, rather than one.
31
The term aparinirva∞a-dharma∞aÌ is used at MSABh ad 17.29-30: it refers to those
do not have the qualities associated with parinirva∞a because they have never put an end
to saµsara (saµsara-vartmatyantanupacchedat). The context here is a discussion of the
types of beings towards whom a bodhisattva should be compassionate.
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first four reasons stated in the verse: having solely ill conduct, having
cut-off roots of virtue (samucchinna-kusala-mula)32, having roots of
virtue unrelated to liberation (amokÒa-bhagiya-kusala-mula), and having inferior roots of virtue (hina-kusala-mula). So sentient beings belonging to this category are without gotra because of some deficiency in
roots of virtue. However, they are understood to be without gotra only
for the present, with the implication that they can acquire a gotra at
some point in time through accumulating an adequate store of the appropriate roots of virtue.
The second option — lacking the qualities associated with parinirva∞a
for ever or absolutely (atyantam) — makes reference to the fifth reason
stated in the verse: lacking the cause, which ostensibly means lacking
any roots of virtue whatsoever. So here we see that there is a certain category of sentient beings who are excluded from acquiring a gotra.
But there is some difficulty in determining in precisely what sense they
are excluded, a difficulty which hinges on the way in which the term
atyantam is translated in this context, a term which has a semantic range
which includes both “for ever” and “absolutely.”33
Translators have dealt with the term atyantam in different ways in this
context. While Ruegg (1969: 80ff.) translates it as absolument, Lévi
(1911: 30) suggests indéfiniment (although this is not included as one of
the meanings of the term in the standard dictionaries). The Tibetan translation (DT sems tsam PHI, 138b3) gives gtan [du], which Das’s dictionary defines as “always, continually, for ever.” The Chinese translation
(Taisho vol. 31, no. 1604, p. 595a25) renders it as bijing, which according to the Digital Dictionary of Buddhism has the basic meaning of
“absolute[ly],” but also has the senses of “finally, in the long run.”34
Hence there has not been a consensus on the meaning of atyantam in this
32
See Davidson 1985: 98-99 regarding samucchinna-kusala-mula in the VaibhaÒika
tradition.
33
The standard Sanskrit-English dictionaries include both of these senses of the term
atyantam. Monier-Williams has “in perpetuity” and “absolutely, completely”; Apte lists
“for ever” and “absolutely”; and the Poona dictionary (edited by Ghatage) also gives
“for ever” and “absolutely.”
34
My thanks to Peter Gregory for providing me with the reference to the Chinese
translation of the MSA/Bh. The term bijing, according to Muller’s Digital Dictionary of
Buddhism, also includes the senses of “positively, decidedly” and “necessarily.”
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context. However, since the term is used in MSABh ad 3.11 in opposition to tat-kala (lit., “that time”; “immediately, the present time”), I think
there is some reason to understand atyantam here in a temporal sense
(viz., as “for ever”). Furthermore, there is evidence that the term atyantam is used in its temporal sense in other locations in the text. For example, at 8.22 the verse-text states that the bodhisattva instructs beings for
as long as the world exists, which the commentary explains as follows:
yaval lokasya bhavas tat-samanaya gatya atyantam ity arthaÌ/
For as long as the world exists — with that same duration — means “for
ever” (atyantam).

And the commentary to 18.44 states that the practice of bodhisattvas
goes on “for ever” (atyantam) because it does not end in nirva∞a without residual conditioning (nirupadhiseÒa-nirva∞e ’pi tad-akÒayat). Furthermore, in the commentary to the Madhyantavibhaga (a text referred to
in the MSABh), the term atyanta is used to gloss sada (“always”)35. Thus
it can be seen that the term atyantam does mean “for ever” in certain contexts. In any case, it is clear that sentient beings belonging to this category — those who are atyantaparinirva∞a-dharma — are without roots
of virtue, without gotra, and hence excluded from attaining any form of
awakening.
It should be emphasized that according to 3.11 roots of virtue (kusalamula) are understood to be the cause of gotra: gotra is acquired through
amassing an adequate store of the appropriate roots of virtue. This is not
so unusual a claim for the MSA/Bh to make, since obtaining roots of
virtue has traditionally been understood as a necessary aspect of the path
to awakening36. Furthermore, Sthiramati’s subcommentary to the Madhyantavibhaga states that one standard definition of gotra is “roots of
35
MAV 1.18b states: sada sattva-hitaya ca/ “And for the benefit of sentient beings
always.” MAVBh ad 1.18b then glosses with: atyanta-sattva-hitarthaµ/ “For the sake of
the benefit of sentient beings for ever (atyanta).” See Sanskrit ed., Nagao 1964: 25.
36
On the importance of the kusala-mula to Buddhist conceptions of the path, see
Buswell 1992; he identifies one basic classification of the kusala-mula as nongreed
(alobha), nonhatred (advesa), and nonignorance (amoha). The MSA/Bh is not the only
text that links the roots of virtue to gotra; for a discussion of the relation between these
two in the context of the MahavibhaÒasastra and the Abhidharmakosa, see Davidson 1985:
92-100.
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virtue.”37 But the MSA/Bh also posits that when the bodhisattva-gotra is
acquired, it in turn becomes a source of further roots of virtue. At 3.3 the
verse-text states that the pre-eminence of the [bodhisattva-]gotra is indicated by the vastness, totality, greatness of purpose, and imperishability
of its purity (subha) — and here the commentary identifies purity with
the roots of virtue. And in 3.9, when the verse-text compares gotra to a
mine of gold38, the commentary states that the bodhisattva-gotra is like a
source of abundant gold since it is the basis of unlimited roots of virtue.
So for the MSA/Bh, acquiring roots of virtue is a necessary condition for
acquiring a gotra (3.11), but when the bodhisattva-gotra is acquired, it
becomes a source of unlimited roots of virtue (3.9).
To conclude this section, it is necessary to consider one further characterization of gotra in the text. At 3.4, the verse-text states:
prak®tya paripuÒ†aµ ca asrayas casritaµ ca tat/
sad asac caiva vijñeyaµ gu∞ottara∞atarthataÌ//
By nature, nourished, support and supported, existing and not existing,
it should truly be known as that which increases virtues.

First we should note that this verse does not offer an addition to the
fivefold list of gotras discussed above; rather, it is introduced by the
commentary as a verse on the characteristics (lakÒa∞as) of gotras in general. The commentary identifies the following four characteristics of
gotra: (1) gotra is natural (prk®tistha) insofar as it has the nature (svabhava) of a support, (2) it is attained (samudanita, a gloss for paripuÒ†aµ
— “nourished” — in the verse) insofar as it has the nature of being
supported, (3) it exists along with its cause (hetu), (4) but it does not exist
along with its fruit. From this we can see that gotra can be attained
— at least by some sentient beings — and that it has a cause. And again,
according to MSA/Bh 3.11, the cause of gotra — the condition for its
acquisition — is the roots of virtue: gotra is acquired when adequate roots
of virtue of the appropriate kind are accumulated. But we must also
remember that, according to MSA/Bh 3.9, when the bodhisattva-gotra is
37

Sanskrit ed., Yamaguchi 1934: 188.
As stated in note 5, one of the meanings of the term gotra is “mine” (as in “a mine
of gems or ores”; see Edgerton 1970, vol. 2: 216, def. 2), thus here the MSA/Bh is playing off that definition of the term.
38
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acquired, it serves as a basis for further roots of virtue. It is in this
sense that we should read characteristic (1) according to the verse above:
gotra is natural insofar as it is a support or basis for further roots of
virtue39.
From all that has been said above, we may summarize the MSA/Bh’s
gotra-theory as follows: (1) having a gotra is a prerequisite for attaining
any form of awakening; (2) there are three specific gotras: the sravaka,
pratyekabuddha-, and bodhisattva-gotras; (3) the first two gotras lead to
lesser forms of awakening, and ultimately to the Hinayana goal of nirva∞a
without residual conditioning — understood as extinction — while the
bodhisattva-gotra leads to complete awakening, the Mahayana goal of
buddhahood — understood as omniscience; (4) some sentient beings are
of an indefinite gotra: they are able to lose their gotra and acquire a different one; (5) some beings are presently without gotra, but can acquire
one through amassing roots of virtue; and (6) some beings are excluded
from acquiring any gotra. Considering these points we are now in a better position to attempt to address the question of whether all sentient
beings can potentially attain awakening.
39
The Bodhisattvabhumi ([BBh] the fifteenth section of the first division of the
Yogacarabhumi, which contains in parts some of the oldest Yogacara materials
[Schmithausen 1969]) also makes use of the classification of prak®tistha-gotra and samudanita-gotra. Yamabe (1997: 195ff.) offers a discussion of the BBh’s interpretation of
these categories; according to that text, the prak®tistha-gotra is beginningless (anadikalika), while the samudanita-gotra is acquired through the accumulation of roots of virtue.
While the MSA/Bh is closely related to the BBh in the selection and order of topics that
it addresses, the two texts do not always address those topics in the same way. For example, the MSA/Bh does not define gotra in terms of the Òa∂ayatana-viseÒa (“distinct state
of the six sense bases”). Furthermore, the MSA/Bh does not use the term anadikalika
(“beginningless”) in connection with the topic of gotra at all. Thus the two texts differ in
their treatments of gotra. For the BBh, a gotra is prak®tistha if it is beginningless (viz., predetermined in some way), whereas for the MSA/Bh a gotra is prak®tistha only in the sense
that it serves as a causal basis for the further accumulation of roots of virtue. [Here note
that one meaning of the term prk®ti is “cause,” so prk®tistha may be interpreted as “existing/operating as a cause.”] The MSA/Bh’s interpretation of prk®tistha may also be seen
at 3.12, where the text states that the bodhisattva-gotra possesses virtues both naturally
(prak®tya) and by nourishment (paripuÒ†asya); thus a bodhisattva-gotra is in one sense
natural (or causal), and in another sense attained (or caused). Finally, both Ruegg (1969:
476-477) and Davidson (1985: 100) state that the prak®tistha/samudanita distinction seems
to be strikingly similar to two types of roots of virtue in the VaibhaÒika tradition — those
that are congenital (upapattilabhika) and those due to application (prayogika).
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Can all beings potentially attain awakening?
Before responding to this question, we must first consider a few relevant
doctrines in the MSA/Bh that have not been addressed thus far. The first,
and most significant for our purposes, is that of the tathagatagarbha, the
“embryo of the Tathagata.” The MSA contains one reference to the tathagatagarbha, which is found at 9.37. This verse and its commentary state:
sarveÒam avisiÒ†api tathata suddhim agata/
tathagatatvaµ tasmac ca tad-garbhaÌ sarva-dehinaÌ//
sarveÒaµ nirvisiÒ†a tathata tad-visuddhi-svabhavas ca tathagataÌ/ ataÌ sarve
sattvas tathagata-garbha ity ucyate/
Although thusness is in all [living beings] without distinction, when it is
pure it is the nature of the Tathagata; thus all living beings have its embryo.
Thusness is in all [living beings] without distinction, and the Tathagata has
the nature of the purity of that. Hence it is said that all sentient beings have
the embryo of the Tathagata.

This verse states that all sentient beings have the embryo of the Tathagata (tathagatagarbha) since all sentient beings have the nature of thusness (tathata). It should be noted that it is possible to interpret this verse
as stating that all beings “are” the embryo of the Tathagata, rather than
all beings “have” the embryo40. The former would imply, however, that
all sentient beings will attain buddhahood, a claim that the MSA/Bh
does not seem inclined to make. In fact, as we have already seen in
the material on gotra, the text states quite clearly that different beings
belong to different gotras and that different gotras lead to different forms
of awakening41; thus not all sentient beings attain buddhahood. Nevertheless, the text does here claim that all sentient beings have the potentiality for attaining buddhahood, even if this potentiality is not actually
realized.
The claim that all sentient beings have the potentiality for attaining buddhahood is not such a strange one for the MSA/Bh to make given its
40
For more on this see Griffiths 1990b: 62-63. Here I am following Griffiths’ translation.
41
Compare this to Haribhadra’s theory of gotra as found in the Abhisamayalaµkaraloka, where from the ultimate point of view gotra is seen as non-distinct in all sentient
beings; see Ruegg 1968, especially: 316-317, and Mano 1967.
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affirmation of mind as fundamentally pure in nature. The first half of
13.19 states:
mataµ ca cittaµ prak®ti-prabhasvaraµ sada tad agantuka-doÒa-duÒitaµ/
Mind should properly be thought of as always luminous by nature; it is
impure due to adventitious defilements.

The commentary further states that mind is like space, or like water that
is pure in itself but made impure by pollutants; and like water, mind can be
purified through removing the defilements. Thus from the perspective of the
text, insofar as sentient beings have (or just are) minds, they may attain the
state of fundamental purity through the removal of adventitious defilements42.
The theme of purity is also discussed at 11.13-14, although here it is
the nature of reality that is fundamentally pure. MSA 11.13 states:
tattvaµ yat satataµ dvayena rahitaµ bhrantes ca saµnisrayaÌ
sakyaµ naiva ca sarvathabhilapituµ yac caprapañcatmakaµ/
jñeyaµ heyam atho visodhyam amalaµ yac ca prak®tya mataµ
yasyakasa-suvar∞a-vari-sad®si klesad visuddhir mata//
Reality — which is always without duality, is the basis of error, and is entirely
inexpressible — does not have the nature of discursivity. It is to be known,
abandoned, and purified. It should properly be thought of as naturally immaculate, since it is purified from defilements, as are space, gold, and water.

As in the commentary to 13.19, the nature of reality — like the nature
of mind — is said to be similar to that of space and water: they are naturally pure and defiled only adventitiously. The next verse goes on to state
that there is nothing else in the world besides this fundamentally pure reality. Thus at an ontological level the MSA/Bh posits that, even though it
serves as the basis of error, reality is fundamentally pure.
This brief excursus into the domain of the MSA/Bh’s ontological discourse is to be understood in relation to our original question. The moves
towards understanding the MSA/Bh’s position on the tathagatagarbhatheory and the MSA/Bh’s doctrine of the fundamental purity of mind and
reality were, I think, necessary in order to more fully consider a response
42
The theme of the fundamental purity of mind and the adventitious nature of defilements may also be found in certain passages in the nikayas/agamas; see Keenan (1980:
21-22) on passages from the Anguttara-nikaya and Majjhima-nikaya that posit the fundamental purity of mind.
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to the question of whether all sentient beings can potentially attain awakening. According to the passages discussed here we see that
(1) All sentient beings have the potentiality for attaining complete awakening (i.e., all beings have the embryo of the Tathagata; MSA/Bh 9.37),
and all beings have the potentiality for purifying their minds, since mind
— like reality itself — is fundamentally pure by nature (MSA/Bh 13.19
and 11.13).

However, we must also consider this claim in relation to the MSA/Bh’s
discourse on gotra, according to which
(2) Having a gotra is a prerequisite for attaining any form of awakening,
but some beings are excluded from acquiring a gotra (MSA/Bh 3.11).

Considering these claims together, we may note a degree of tension
between (1) and (2). More specifically, according to (1) all sentient beings
have the potentiality for complete awakening, while the implication of
(2) is that some beings are excluded from the attainment of any form of
awakening at all, in that they are excluded from acquiring the “seed”
(gotra) necessary for awakening. The issue here is in what sense we
should understand the state of being excluded — and, more specifically,
in what sense we should understand the term atyantam in the commentary to 3.11. Are sentient beings of this category — those who are atyantaparinirva∞a-dharma — excluded “absolutely”? “For ever”? Does anything hinge on deciding one way or the other?
I would argue that something does indeed hinge on such a decision, that
it is not philosophically insignificant whether atyantam is translated as
“absolutely” or “for ever” in this context. To say that some beings are
“absolutely” without the qualities associated with parinirva∞a —
absolutely without gotra — implies that some beings are “unconditionally” in this state43: it implies that these sentient beings unconditionally
lack gotra — hence they simply do not attain any form of awakening,
without reference to any other conditions or qualifications. This would
pose a problem in interpreting the text consistently, in that we have already
seen that gotra is not unconditional: the condition for its acquisition is the
43
The Oxford English Dictionary offers one definition of “absolutely” as “without condition or limitation; unconditionally.”

CAN ALL BEINGS POTENTIALLY ATTAIN AWAKENING?

133

roots of virtue. Furthermore, understanding atyantam here as “absolutely”
intensifies the tension between (1) and (2): it would imply the problematic conclusion that although all beings have the potentiality for complete
awakening, some beings are absolutely unable to attain any form of awakening at all. On the other hand, saying that some beings are “for ever”
without the qualities associated with parinirva∞a — for ever without
gotra — does not imply that any beings are unconditionally in this category. Rather, it implies that some beings simply always remain in this category due to a conditional lack in roots of virtue. And translating atyantam here as “for ever” would significantly reduce the tension between (1)
and (2): it would allow that while all beings have the potentiality for
complete awakening, some beings simply never actualize this potentiality. In fact, according to the text there is always a surplus or remainder
of sentient beings who have not been ripened to awakening, since the
world is infinite44.
I would propose that a more perspicuous means of clarifying and
addressing the tension between (1) and (2) — between a doctrine of universal potentiality for buddhahood and the exclusion of certain sentient
beings from attaining awakening — may be found through introducing the
modal concepts of necessity, possibility, and contingency. It should first
be noted that the MSA/Bh does not employ these concepts in this or any
other context; in fact, to my knowledge, the concepts of modal logic are
not fully articulated anywhere in the history of Indian Buddhist thought.
What I propose then is of the nature of a rational reconstruction. Briefly,
Haack specifies the distinction between necessary and contingent truths
as follows: “a necessary truth is one which could not be otherwise, a contingent truth one which could; or, the negation of a necessary truth is
impossible or contradictory, the negation of a contingent truth possible or
consistent; or, a necessary truth is true in all possible worlds, a contingent
truth is true in the actual but not in all possible worlds” (1978: 170).
To this we may add that a possible truth is one whose negation is not necessary. I would argue that a reconstruction of (1) and (2) employing modal
concepts allows for a clarification of the claims at MSA/Bh 9.37 and 3.11,
and the elimination of the tension between them. Through introducing the
44

MSABh ad 9.49: na ca niÌseÒaµ lokasyanantatvat/.
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concepts of possibility and contingency, we might restate propositions (1)
and (2) in the following terms:
(1') For all x such that x is a sentient being, it is possible that x will attain
complete awakening.
(2') For some x such that x is a sentient being, it is contingent that x is without gotra, and hence without any form of awakening.

These two propositions are consistent with one another, since there is
no contradiction in stating that awakening is possible for all beings even
though some beings do not in fact attain it. Note, however, that if we
were to translate atyantam as “absolutely” at MSABh ad 3.11, then (2')
would be restated as follows:
(2'') For some x such that x is a sentient being, it is necessary that x is without gotra, and hence without any form of awakening.

Such a proposition would be inconsistent with (1'), since it is contradictory to state that it is possible for all beings to attain awakening but
necessary that some do not. Thus my reconstruction of (2) entails interpreting atyantam as a term implying contingency rather than necessity45.
And so I propose that the claims at MSA/Bh 9.37 and 3.11 be read in
terms of propositions (1') and (2'), respectively.
The tension which I raise between (1) and (2) is one which has been
noticed by Tibetan and Indian Buddhist traditions. In his study of the theories of tathagatagarbha and gotra, Ruegg (1969: 82) states that the apparent contradiction between MSA/Bh 9.37 and 3.11 has divided Tibetan commentators, and that certain Tibetan commentators have argued that the
tathagatagarbha-verse (9.37) is to be understood as having a sens intentionnel in this context — that its claim is not definitive for the MSA/Bh.
Also notable is the fact that in the subcommentary to the Madhyantavibhaga
(again, a text cited in the MSABh), Sthiramati offers two rather conflicting
interpretations of gotra46: according to the first interpretation, different
gotras are “inherent” (svabhavikam) and “beginningless” (anadikalikam)
in different individuals — for example, some have the sravaka-gotra and
45
My thanks to Jay Garfield for suggesting this way of stating the point to me in
conversation.
46
See Sanskrit ed., Yamaguchi 1934: 55-56.
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others the buddha-gotra — a view that implies a theory of predetermined
and distinct “seeds” of awakening. According to the second interpretation,
however, all beings have the tathagata-gotra — a view that implies a theory of universal potentiality for buddhahood. And Sthiramati does not indicate which interpretation is to be understood as definitive. Thus we can see
that even in the Indian context there was some debate over whether all
beings have the tathagatagarbha or whether different beings just have different gotras, with some beings excluded from the attainment of complete
awakening, and others — those who are inherently without gotra —
excluded from the attainment of any form of awakening at all. We might
speculate that had the modal concepts of necessity, possibility, and contingency been developed in a rigorous fashion and employed in the context of
a controversy between the theories of tathagatagarbha and gotra, any inconsistency between the two theories — at least as they occur in the MSA/Bh
— could have been resolved. Again, the reconstruction which I propose
involves the two steps of interpreting atyantam at MSABh ad 3.11 as “for
ever” — a step supported by both internal and external evidence — and
interpreting (1) as a statement of possibility and (2) as a statement of contingency.
To conclude, in response to our initial question of whether all sentient
beings can potentially attain awakening, we may state the following: in
the terms of the MSA/Bh itself, while all beings have the embryo of the
Tathagata, some beings are simply for ever without the “seed” (gotra) of
awakening. And in the terms of my proposed reconstruction: while all sentient beings can potentially attaining awakening, it is contingently the
case that some beings will never actually do so47.
Abbreviations
AA:
BBh:
DT:
MAV:

Abhisamayalaµkara
Bodhisattvabhumi
Derge Tanjur (Sde dge bstan ’gyur)
Madhyantavibhaga

47
It may be interesting to consider this interpretation in relation to Anguttara-nikaya
V: 193-195, where, after a discussion of the fourteen restricted points, the Buddha remains
silent in response to the question of whether the whole world will attain deliverance.
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MAVBh: Madhyantavibhaga-bhaÒya
MSA:
Mahayanasutralaµkara (verse-text)
MSABh: Mahayanasutralaµkara-bhaÒya (commentary)
MSA/Bh: Mahayanasutralaµkara and Mahayanasutralaµkara-bhaÒya
MSAT:
Mahayanasutralaµkara-†ika (Asvabhava’s subcommentary)
MSAVBh: Mahayanasutralaµkara-v®tti-bhaÒya (Sthiramati’s subcommentary)
SNS:
Saµdhinirmocana-sutra
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